NORTH CAROLINA BANKING
INSTITUTE
Volume 24

Issue 1

Article 11

3-1-2020

Funding the Future: Marketplace Lending Equity Crowdfunding,
and Bank Lending
Brage Humphries

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Brage Humphries, Funding the Future: Marketplace Lending Equity Crowdfunding, and Bank Lending, 24
N.C. BANKING INST. 217 (2020).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi/vol24/iss1/11

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in North Carolina Banking Institute by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

Funding the Future: Marketplace Lending, Equity
Crowdfunding, and Bank Lending
I. INTRODUCTION
In October 2017, Arthur Moye, CEO of Full Circle Brewing Co.,
needed a $1 million loan to upgrade and expand his brewery in Fresno,
California. 1 His expansion plan included purchasing larger brewing
tanks to quadruple the brewery’s capacity, renovating the brewery’s
building, and going beyond brewing kegs of beer to producing cans of
beer to sell in stores such as Safeway and Costco. 2 Initially, Moye sought
a traditional bank loan. 3 However, instead of providing Full Circle with
a $1 million loan, Fresno First Bank suggested that the company work
with crowdfunding firm Breakaway Funding LLC to raise enough capital
to reduce the bank’s risks of lending. 4 The crowdfunding campaign
allowed the average person to purchase a stake in the brewery with a
minimum investment of only $500. 5 As of January 2018, Full Circle
raised $124,000 through equity crowdfunding, which then allowed the
company to obtain a $685,000 traditional loan from Fresno First Bank. 6
In October 2019, Full Circle estimated that over the past two years, its
production capacity increased fifteen-fold, and its revenues increased by
335%. 7
Small businesses and startups such as Full Circle traditionally
face great difficulty in raising money from customary sources of business
finance, such as bank lending and venture capital. 8 Although bank

1. David Castellon, Full Circle Brewing Taps Success from Equity Crowdfunding, THE
BUSINESS J. (Jan. 26, 2018, 9:09 AM), https://thebusinessjournal.com/full-circle-brewingtaps-success-equity-crowdfunding/ [https://perma.cc/Q2NS-5BUF].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. About Us, FULL CIRCLE BREWING CO., https://fullcirclebrewing.com/pages/about-us
[https://perma.cc/2VU7-MGFD] (last visited Oct. 11, 2019).
8. C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012).
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lending remains a major source of funds for entrepreneurial ventures, 9
banks are commonly concerned about businesses’ creditworthiness. 10
This concern makes banks hesitant to provide loans to businesses before
they have a proven track record, consistent cash flows, and an adequate
amount of tangible assets they can use as collateral. 11 The 2008 financial
crisis only increased these concerns. 12 Although venture capital and
angel investors address a portion of this need for funding, these investors
are extremely selective and often only invest in companies with the
potential for explosive growth. 13 From 1981 to 2005, an average of only
0.1% of startups per year in the United States received venture capital
funding. 14 In response to this gap, crowdfunding developed as a method
of alternative finance for these small businesses and startups. 15
Through the use of online platforms, crowdfunding projects are
able to largely bypass bank intermediaries. 16 The recent growth of
crowdfunding—particularly
lending-based
and
equity-based
crowdfunding platforms—calls into question traditional lending models
used by banks. 17 The rising crowdfunding industry has replaced some

9. Xavier Walthoff-Borm et al., Equity Crowdfunding: First Resort or Last Resort?, 33
J. OF BUS. VENTURING 513, 515 (2018).
10. Id.
11. Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, The Economics of Small Business Finance: The
Roles of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle, 22 J. OF BANKING
& FIN. 613, 623–24 (1998) (stating that banks will generally not lend to small businesses until
“they achieve a level of production where their balance sheets reflect substantial business
assets that might be pledged as collateral . . . .”).
12. See Walthoff-Borm et al., supra note 9, at 515 (explaining the rise of crowdfunding
as an alternative to traditional bank finance following the 2008 financial crisis).
13. Id.
14. Manjur Puri & Rebecca Zarutskie, On the Life Cycle Dynamics of Venture-Capital
and Non-Venture-Capital-Financed Firms, 67 J. OF FIN. 2247, 2255 (2012) (examining
venture capital statistics for the period 1981 to 2005).
15. See Walthoff-Borm et al., supra note 9, at 516 (explaining how crowdfunding
provides entrepreneurs with an alternative to traditional forms of equity financing and bank
financing).
16. See Raymond Michaels, How Crowdfunding is Challenging the Banking Sector,
INT’L BANKER (Sept. 14, 2015), https://internationalbanker.com/banking/how-crowdfundingis-challenging-the-banking-sector/
[https://perma.cc/9Z69-FQ48]
(“Investment
crowdfunding appears to be filling a gap for small businesses deemed too risky to obtain
financing through traditional banking methods.”).
17. See id. (“As a consequence of this explosive growth, crowdfunding has been asking
several pertinent questions of the traditional lending models used by banks.”).
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conventional banking functions. 18 Banks must decide whether to
compete against or collaborate with this new and growing practice. 19
This Note examines current forms of crowdfunding and explores
competition between crowdfunding and bank lending. This Note
proceeds in four parts. Part II explains crowdfunding and various
methods of crowdfunding. 20 Part III examines the current impact of
crowdfunding on traditional bank lending. 21 Part IV explores existing
partnerships between banks and crowdfunding platforms. 22 Part V offers
recommendations for how banks should adapt to the crowdfunding
industry. 23
II. CROWDFUNDING
Crowdfunding is a method of raising money for projects or
ventures from a large number of people. 24 Today, this is typically
performed via the Internet. 25
Crowdfunding is a mode of
26
crowdsourcing.
While many believe crowdfunding to be a new
phenomenon, forms of crowdfunding were used throughout history. 27
For example, in 1885, New York City was short on funds for a pedestal
18. See id. (providing examples of banks being bypassed for by small businesses seeking
financing).
19. See id. (“Banks have been deciding whether this revolutionary industry should be
regarded as friend or foe, and as a result, have had to choose between collaborating or
competing with [online crowdfunding platforms].”).
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part III.
22. See infra Part IV.
23. See infra Part V.
24. Crowdfunding, OXFORD UNIV. PRESS: OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY ONLINE (3d ed.
2015),
https://www-oedcom.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/view/Entry/429943?rskey=hxdLYt&result=2&isAdvanced=false#
eid [https://perma.cc/H475-R76F] (defining crowdfunding as “the practice of funding a
project or venture by raising money from a large number of people, each of whom contributes
a relatively small amount, typically via the Internet.”).
25. Id.
26. Crowdsourcing, OXFORD UNIV. PRESS: OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY ONLINE (3d ed.
2013),
https://www-oedcom.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/view/Entry/376403?rskey=2wuyt8&result=2&isAdvanced=false#
eid [https://perma.cc/ZL84-4994] (defining crowdsourcing as “[t]he practice of obtaining
information or services by soliciting input from a large number of people, typically via the
internet and often without offering compensation.”).
27. See JD Alois, Kickstarter: On This Date, Joseph Pulitzer Completed Crowdfunding
Project for Statue of Liberty, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Aug. 11, 2014, 5:19 PM),
https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014/08/46581-kickstarter-date-joseph-pulitzercompleted-crowdfunding-project-statue-liberty/
[https://perma.cc/3NML-DBWX]
(describing the story of crowdfunding for the pedestal of the statue of liberty).
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for the Statue of Liberty, recently gifted from France. 28 In response,
Joseph Pulitzer led a successful rewards-based crowdfunding campaign
to secure funding for the pedestal, rewarding gifts of one dollar or more
with twelve-inch replicas of the Statue of Liberty. 29
Today,
30
crowdfunding sites such as Kickstarter.com, GoFundMe.com, 31 and
Indiegogo.com 32 receive considerable attention as methods for
entrepreneurs to fund their ideas. 33
Crowdfunding intermediaries represent platforms that “act as
matchmakers between capital-seeking agents and capital-giving agents,
funneling the funding from the investors to the capital-seeking
enterprises.” 34 Unlike traditional financial intermediaries, crowdfunding
platforms merely facilitate funding instead of borrowing or lending on
their own account. 35 Crowdfunding platforms are examples of financial
technology (“fintech”) companies. 36 Crowdfunding is generally split into
five categories: (1) donation-based crowdfunding, (2) rewards-based
crowdfunding, (3) pre-purchase-based crowdfunding, (4) marketplace
lending, and (5) equity-based crowdfunding. 37 Although donation-

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. KICKSTARTER, kickstarter.com [https://perma.cc/EDY5-NTRE] (last visited Oct. 5,

2019).
31. GOFUNDME, gofundme.com [https://perma.cc/WH4K-SPSG] (last visited Oct. 5,
2019).
32. INDIEGOGO, indiegogo.com [https://perma.cc/JFM6-QCXM] (last visited Oct. 5,
2019).
33. Ed Oswald, The Best Crowdfunding Sites for 2019, DIGITAL TRENDS (Feb. 26, 2019,
3:10
PM),
https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/best-crowdfunding-sites/
[https://perma.cc/FDS2-PNSS].
34. Kalle Setälä, Crowdfunding in the Banking Industry: Adjusting to a Digital Era
(2017) (unpublished Master’s thesis, Jyväskylä University School of Business and
Economics),
https://jyx.jyu.fi/bitstream/handle/123456789/53061/1/URN%3ANBN%3Afi%3Ajyu201702171470.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DW8-FVR6].
35. Id.
36. “Fintech” is a term that “encompasses all forms of innovative digital and software
technologies applied directly to the financial services sector.” Luke G. Thomas, Note, The
Case for A Federal Regulatory Sandbox for Fintech Companies, 22 N.C. BANKING INST. 257,
260 (2018).
37. Arooj Z. Nazir, The Development of Real Estate Crowdfunding: Will It Surpass
Traditional Real Estate Financing?, 24 PIABA B.J. 77, 81 (2017).
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based, 38 rewards-based, and pre-purchase-based crowdfunding 39 are
popular forms of crowdfunding, 40 this Note focuses on the for-profit
crowdfunding methods of equity crowdfunding 41 and marketplace
lending. 42
38. Donations-based crowdfunding allows individuals to contribute donations to a
crowdfunding effort without receiving anything in return. See id. (describing various types
of crowdfunding, including donations-based crowdfunding). If a crowdfunding campaign
includes no potential for return in exchange for a contribution, then there is no offering of
securities. Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the
Securities Laws-Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must be Conditioned on Meaningful
Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1739 (2012) (explaining that if there is no “express or
implied possibility of a return to the donor, there is no offering of securities.”). Because
donors have no possibility of return, this model of crowdfunding does not meet the definition
of “investment contract” outlined in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. and therefore does not implicate
securities laws. S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946) (defining
“investment contract” as “a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his
money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party . . . .”). Donations may fund for-profit enterprises, but most donation
sites focus on non-profit organizations. Bradford, supra note 8, at 15–16. Popular donationsbased crowdfunding sites include globalgiving.org, GLOBALGIVING, globalgiving.org
[https://perma.cc/2QPM-E22G] (last visited Sept. 21, 2019), and donorschoose.org.
DONORSCHOOSE.ORG, donorschoose.org [https://perma.cc/M765-B7V8] (last visited Sept. 21,
2019). Pure donations-based crowdfunding sites are rare. Id. at 15.
39. Rewards-based crowdfunding provides contributors to a crowdfunding effort with a
“tangible benefit in exchange for their donation.” Nazir, supra note 37, at 81–82. Prepurchase-based crowdfunding is similar to rewards-based crowdfunding and is where
contributors receive the product that the business or entrepreneur creates. Bradford, supra
note 8, at 16. In order to avoid implicating securities laws, the benefit for both forms of
crowdfunding cannot involve a financial return such as “interest, dividends, or part of the
earnings of the business.” Id. Rewards and pre-purchase-based crowdfunding are the most
common forms of crowdfunding. Nazir, supra note 37, at 81. Popular platforms that use
these forms of crowdfunding include Kickstarter, GoFundMe, and Indiegogo. Jackie
Zimmermann, Rewards-Based Crowdfunding: What it is, When it Works, NERDWALLET (Dec.
6,
2017),
https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/small-business/reward-crowdfunding/
[https://perma.cc/887R-2FFM]. Examples of rewards given to backers include t-shirts, digital
downloads of albums, and “thank you” calls. Bradford, supra note 8, at 18. In its first case
involving crowdfunding, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) took legal action in 2015
against a project creator who raised funds through Kickstarter for a board game but spent most
of the funds on himself. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Crowdfunding Project Creator
Settles FTC Charges of Deception (June 11, 2015) https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2015/06/crowdfunding-project-creator-settles-ftc-charges-deception
[https://perma.cc/QSN4-DF6Q] (describing the first crowdfunding case the FTC became
involved in). In the campaign, the defendant raised over $122,000 from 1,246 backers,
promising them rewards of a copy of the game or a figurine. Id. The case settled and
represents an ongoing effort by the FTC to protect consumers involved in fintech and the
potential for the FTC to become involved in this form of crowdfunding in the future. Id.
40. See Nazir, supra note 37, at 81–82 (describing that the pre-purchase-based
crowdfunding is the most common form of crowdfunding, while providing examples of
successful donations-based crowdfunding platforms and rewards-based crowdfunding
campaigns).
41. See infra Part II.A.
42. See infra Part II.B.
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Equity Crowdfunding

Equity crowdfunding is a process that allows investors to
purchase ownership interests in companies. 43 Because this form of
crowdfunding involves the sale of a security, 44 it implicates federal
securities laws and is subject to regulation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”). 45 In general, any sale or offering of securities
must qualify for an exemption in order to avoid registration under the
Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”). 46 Prior to 2012, equity
crowdfunding platforms were primarily governed by the Regulation D
(“Reg D”) and Regulation A (“Reg A”) 1933 Act exemptions. 47 These
exemptions decrease regulatory obligations for issuers, reducing their
costs and time to raise capital. 48
On March 27, 2012, Congress enacted the Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”) in order to expand access to public
capital markets for emerging growth companies. 49 Congress designated
Title III of the JOBS Act as the Capital Raising Online While Deterring
Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act of 2012 (“CROWDFUND
Act”). 50 The CROWDFUND Act served as the foundation for equity
crowdfunding in the United States. 51 This Act provided an exemption
from registration with the SEC for the offer and sale of up to $1 million
of securities in a twelve-month period to non-accredited investors. 52
43. John S. (Jack) Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg,
Saverin, and Venture Capitalists’ Dilution of the Crowd, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 583,
589 (2013).
44. S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 297–99 (1946).
45. Bradford, supra note 8, at 33.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2018).
47. SCOTT BAUGUESS ET AL., U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE
U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET FOR UNREGISTERED SECURITIES OFFERINGS, 2009‐2017 5
(2018), https://www.sec.gov/files/DERA%20white%20paper_Regulation%20D_082018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BH2R-F43W].
48. Id. at 3.
49. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”), Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat.
306 (2012) (codified as amended in various sections of 15 U.S.C.).
50. Id.
51. Max E. Isaacson, Note, The So-Called Democratization of Capital Markets: Why
Title III of the Jobs Act Fails to Fulfill the Promise of Crowdfunding, 20 N.C. BANKING INST.
439, 440 (2016).
52. A non-accredited investor is any investor who does not meet the income or net worth
requirements to be an accredited investor as defined by the SEC. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)
(2019). For natural persons to be considered accredited investors, the current standard is an
individual net worth or joint net worth with that person’s spouse of over $1,000,000 excluding
the value of the primary residence, id. at § 230.501(a)(5), or an individual income of $200,000
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On October 15, 2015, the SEC adopted a rule called Regulation
Crowdfunding (“Reg CF”) that became effective on May 16, 2016 and
implemented the requirements of the CROWDFUND Act. 53 Under the
rule as updated in 2017, issuers can raise up to an aggregate of $1.07
million over a twelve-month period without registering their offering
with the SEC. 54 The aggregate amount individuals may invest in
offerings shall not exceed the greater of $2200 or five percent of the
investor’s annual income if the investor’s annual income is less than
$107,000. 55 If the investor’s annual income and net worth are equal to or
greater than $107,000, then the individual can invest up to the lesser of
either ten percent of his or her annual income, or ten percent of his or her
net worth, up to a maximum of $107,000. 56 Reg CF also introduced the
funding portal, a new kind of entity that acts as an intermediary in
transactions involving the offer or sale of securities on behalf of others. 57
This regulation allows ordinary retail investors to invest in private
businesses as a crowd through these funding portals. 58
Companies relying on Reg D are exempt from registering their
offerings but must file “Form D”, which includes information about the
issuer’s identity, principal place of business, related persons, industry
group, and other basic information. 59 Currently, Reg D consists of three
or more annually, or a joint income of $300,000 or more including the income of a spouse.
Id. at § 230.501(a)(6).
53. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71387 (Nov. 16, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200,
227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269 & 274).
54. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(1). Under the original rule, issuers could raise up to an
aggregate of $1 million over a 12-month period without registering their offering with the
SEC. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71387, 71391 (Nov. 16, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts.
200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269 & 274).
55. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(2)(i). Under the original rule, the aggregate amount
individuals could invest in offerings could not exceed the greater of $2,000 or five percent of
the investor’s annual income if the investor’s annual income was less than $100,000.
Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71387, 71392 (Nov. 16, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200,
227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269, & 274).
56. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(2)(ii). Under the original rule, if the investor’s annual income
and net worth are equal to or greater than $100,000, then the investor could invest up to the
lesser of ten percent of his or her annual income or ten percent of his or her net worth, with a
maximum of $100,000. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71387, 71390 (Nov. 16, 2015) (codified
at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269 & 274).
57. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71387 (Nov. 16, 2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200,
227, 232, 239, 240, 249, 269 & 274).
58. Georgia Quinn, Title III Crowdfunding: Talking About a Revolution, CROWDFUND
INSIDER (Oct. 30, 2015, 12:32 PM), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2015/10/76506-titleiii-crowdfunding-talking-about-a-revolution/ [https://perma.cc/4FBY-HKGY].
59. Examples of other basic information required in Form D includes issuer size, federal
exemptions and exclusions claimed, type of filing, duration of offering, type(s) of securities
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rules: Rule 504, 60 Rule 506(b), 61 and Rule 506(c). 62 Between 2009 and
2017, almost all of the reported offerings through Reg D used Rules
506(b) and 506(c). 63 Rule 506(b) prohibits general solicitation and
advertising and limits investors to accredited investors and up to thirtyfive sophisticated, non-accredited investors. 64 Rule 506(c), as amended
by the SEC pursuant to Title II of the JOBS Act, 65 permits general
solicitation and advertising if the offering is limited to accredited
investors. 66 In 2017, $1.8 trillion of capital was raised using Rules 506(b)
or 506(c), 67 with an overwhelming majority raised pursuant to Rule
506(b). 68
Reg A 69 was amended in 2015 pursuant to Title IV of the JOBS
70
Act. The amended regulation (“Reg A+”) increased the exemption for
registration requirements for private offerings from up to $5 million to up
to $50 million over a twelve-month period. 71 Reg A+ splits offerings into
two tiers. 72 Each tier is subject to certain reporting requirements and
regulatory compliance. 73 Tier 1 requires only exit reports, while Tier 2
requires annual reports, semiannual reports, current event reports, audited

offered, whether the offer involves a business combination transaction, minimum investment,
sales compensation, offering and sales amount, sales compensation, offering and sales
amounts, investors, sales commissions and finders’ fee expenses, and use of proceeds. Form
D: Notice of Exempt Offerings of Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formd.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9DK-45ZU].
60. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2015).
61. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b).
62. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c); BAUGUESS ET AL., supra note 47, at 4.
63. Between 2009 and 2017, 99.9% of the reported offerings through Reg D used Rules
506(b) and 506(c). BAUGUESS ET AL., supra note 47 at 2.
64. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i).
65. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”) § 201, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126
Stat 306 (2012) (codified as amended in various sections of 15 U.S.C.).
66. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c).
67. BAUGUESS ET AL., supra note 47, at 4.
68. From September 23, 2013, to December 31, 2017, only 4.4% of Rule 506 offerings
have raised capital pursuant to Rule 506(c), with 95.6% of offerings having raised capital
pursuant to Rule 506(b). Id. at 15.
69. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2017).
70. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”), Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat.
306 (2012) (codified as amended in various sections of 15 U.S.C.).
71. Isaacson, supra note 51, at 448.
72. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251. Tier 1 allows issuers to offer up to $20 million over a 12-month
period and Tier 2 allowing issuers to offer up to $50 million over a 12-month period. Id. Tier
1 does not put a limit on non-accredited investors investing in a Tier 1 offering, while Tier 2
limits the amount that non-accreditors can invest to no more than 10% of the purchaser’s net
worth or annual income, whichever is greater. Id. at § 230.251(d)(2)(i)(C).
73. Isaacson, supra note 51, at 448.
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financial statements, and exit reports. 74 Reg A+ acts as an alternative to
a small Initial Public Offering or other securities offering methods under
the 1933 Act. 75 However, the cost of regulatory compliance creates a
high barrier for Reg A+ offerings, making this exemption unlikely to
trump Reg D for raising capital. 76 Compared to Reg CF and Reg A
offerings, Reg D offerings raise more capital and occur more
frequently. 77
B.

Marketplace Lending

Marketplace lending 78 involves contributors who loan money and
expect their loans to be returned in the future, normally with interest. 79
This form of crowdfunding involves the “crowd” lending to borrowers
through unsecured loans. 80 These loans are typically made to individuals
or small businesses. 81 The most common form of marketplace loans are
unsecured consumer loans, while small business loans are a growing
second. 82 The two most popular marketplace lenders are LendingClub 83
and Prosper. 84 As of June 30, 2019, LendingClub issued over $50 billion
in loans 85 while Prosper facilitated more than $16 billion in loans as of
74. 17 C.F.R. § 230.257 (2019).
75. ANZHELA KNYAZEVA, SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, REGULATION A+: WHAT DO WE

KNOW SO FAR? 2 (2016), https://www.sec.gov/files/Knyazeva_RegulationA%20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QYB2-LRQG] (analyzing Regulation A+ activity for approximately 16
months after the amendments to Regulation A became effective).
76. Isaacson, supra note 51, at 449.
77. BAUGUESS ET AL., supra note 47, at 9.
78. Marketplace lending is also known as peer-to-peer lending. John L. Douglas, New
Wine into Old Bottles: Fintech Meets the Bank Regulatory World, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 17,
27 (2016). This practice is also referred to as debt crowdfunding, person-to-person lending,
P2P lending, or lending-based crowdfunding. Wroldsen, supra note 43, at 588–89.
79. Wroldsen, supra note 43, at 588–89.
80. David M. Freeman & Matthew R. Nutting, A Brief History of Crowdfunding, 1, 3
(2015),
http://www.freedman-chicago.com/ec4i/History-of-Crowdfunding.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ND2B-TTST].
81. David W. Perkins, Marketplace Lending: Fintech in Consumer and Small-Business
Lending, CONG. RES. SERV. 1 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44614.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D2PF-75LD].
82. Marketplace
Lending
2.0,
DELOITTE
(2017),
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/financial-services/articles/marketplace-lending-andbanks-report.html [https://perma.cc/66DU-7CVN].
83. LENDINGCLUB,
https://www.lendingclub.com/info/statistics.action
[https://perma.cc/L6X6-8TYU] (last visited Sept. 21, 2019).
84. PROSPER, https://www.prosper.com/about [https://perma.cc/M88S-KNLC] (last
visited Sept. 21, 2019).
85. LENDINGCLUB, supra note 83.
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September 15, 2019. 86 To provide a loan, the marketplace lending
platform must approve the borrower. 87 Once approved, the borrower
receives a credit risk score and an interest rate determined by the
platform. 88 Because most of the platform’s services are automated,
getting a loan can be easier, faster, and more cost effective than
borrowing from a bank. 89
In 2008, the SEC issued a cease and desist order against
Prosper. 90 The SEC declared that Prosper, and by extension other
marketplace lending platforms, were offering securities. 91 Following the
SEC’s cease and desist order, marketplace lending platforms had to shelf
register 92 each loan before a lender’s investment. 93 Details of each
funded loan are now recorded on EDGAR. 94
The cease and desist order also changed how marketplace lending
platforms conduct their transactions. 95 Before the SEC’s order, platforms
such as Prosper and LendingClub originated loans to borrowers, and
WebBank, a Utah-chartered industrial bank 96 funded the loans. 97
WebBank then assigned the note to the lender through the platform. 98
After the order, notes issued by Prosper and similar marketplace lending
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

PROSPER, supra note 84.
Freeman & Nutting, supra note 80, at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 8984, 2008 WL 4978684, at
*1
(Nov.
24,
2008),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2008/33-8984.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DA6X-D5QJ].
91. Id. at *4.
92. Shelf registration is a method for issuers to register new offerings on a delayed basis
without having to issue them immediately. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (2019) (describing the
process of shelf registration). Shelf registration allows an issuer to register a group of
securities and then issue them in parts. See Andrew Verstein, The Misregulation of Personto-Person Lending, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 445, 489 (2011) (explaining the advantages of shelf
registration for peer-to-peer lending platforms). Shelf registration is essential for peer-to-peer
lending platforms because it allows issuers “economies of scale in registration.” Id.
93. See Benjamin Lo, It Ain’t Broke: The Case for Continued SEC Regulation of P2P
Lending, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 87, 89 (2016) (describing the shelf registration process for
peer-to-peer loans).
94. EDGAR is the SEC’s publicly accessible disclosure database. Id.
95. Verstein, supra note 92, at 476–77.
96. An industrial bank is “a financial institution deriving funds from the sale of
investment certificates and from deposits made by individual savers and investing such funds
in personal loans often secured by a comaker note or chattel mortgage.” Industrial Bank,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
ONLINE
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/industrial%20bank [https://perma.cc/AFJ2-ZB2U] (last visited Oct.
25, 2019).
97. Verstein, supra note 92, at 476.
98. Id.
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platforms continue to remain the platform’s obligation. 99 These notes,
also known as “borrower payment dependent notes,” 100 are debt
instruments sold to lenders who then receive money contingent on
borrower repayment. 101 After the SEC’s cease and desist order, all
marketplace lending platforms either registered with the SEC or failed. 102
While the marketplace lending platform now formally retains loans that
are funded and selected by investors, in practice investors bear the credit
risk because the notes offered by the platforms are only payable once
borrowers make payments on their loans. 103 Despite these changes in
regulation and transactions following the SEC’s order in 2008,
marketplace lending remains popular. 104
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) tasked the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (“GAO”) with studying marketplace lending in order to develop
an “optimal federal regulatory structure.” 105 The GAO study was
completed in 2011 and found two primary regulatory options for
marketplace lending, which offered different approaches to lender
protection. 106 The two options recommended by the GAO included: “(1)
continuing with the current bifurcated federal system—that is, protecting
lenders through securities regulators and borrowers primarily through
financial services regulators . . . or (2) consolidating borrower and lender
protection under a single federal regulator, such as CFPB.” 107 However,
the report was inconclusive on which option Congress should select, so
marketplace lending platforms remain regulated by the SEC. 108

Id. at 476–77.
Id. at 477.
Id. at 476–77.
Chang-hsien Tsai, To Regulate or Not to Regulate? A Comparison of Government
Responses to Peer-to-Peer Lending Among the United States, China, and Taiwan, 87 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1077, 1085 (2018).
103. Id. at 1084.
104. Lo, supra note 93, at 90. For example, LendingClub has issued over $50 billion in
loans as of June 30, 2019, LENDINGCLUB, supra note 83, while Prosper has facilitated more
than $16 billion in loans as of September 15, 2019. PROSPER, supra note 84.
105. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank
Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 989F(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1947 (2010) (tasking the GAO with
conducting a study to determine the optimal federal regulatory structure for person to person
lending).
106. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REP. NO. 11-613 42 (2011),
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11613.pdf [https://perma.cc/AM7B-T999].
107. Id.
108. Id.
99.
100.
101.
102.
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The proper regulation of marketplace lending and other fintech
companies remains open to debate. 109 In 2016, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (“the OCC”) offered guidance on the
possibility of creating a special purpose national bank charter for fintech
companies, 110 including marketplace lending platforms. 111 The OCC
declared that a fintech company must, at minimum, receive deposits, pay
checks, or lend money to receive a special purpose bank charter. 112
However, in May 2019, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York held that the OCC could not issue a special purpose bank
charter to a fintech company that does not receive deposits. 113 The court
held that the National Bank Act 114 was unambiguous that the “business
of banking” requires receiving deposits. 115 While this decision calls into
question the OCC’s ability to issue a special purpose bank charter for a
fintech company, it remains unclear whether marketplace lending
platforms are included in the OCC’s definition of a fintech company. 116
III. THE IMPACT OF CROWDFUNDING ON BANK LENDING
While bank lending continues to be a major source of capital for
businesses, banks remain concerned about firm creditworthiness and are
hesitant to provide loans to businesses without proven track records,
consistent cash flows, 117 or sufficient assets to pledge as collateral. 118
This reluctance increased as a result of the 2008 financial crisis, 119 as
banks became more “risk-averse” and faced tightened regulations in its
109. See Tsai, supra note 102, at 1084–87 (discussing various approaches to the regulation
of marketplace lending and fintech companies from 2011 to 2016).
110. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, Exploring Special Purpose National
Bank Charters for Fintech Companies 4 (2016), https://www.occ.gov/publications-andresources/publications/banker-education/files/pub-special-purpose-nat-bank-chartersfintech.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CQL-TT6S].
111. See Thomas, supra note 36 (describing fintech as including “all forms of innovative
digital and software technologies applied directly to the financial services sector.”).
112. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 110.
113. Vullo v. Office of Comptroller of Currency, 378 F. Supp. 3d 271, 298 (S.D.N.Y.
2019).
114. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21–43 (2018).
115. Vullo v. Office of Comptroller of Currency, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 298.
116. Tsai, supra note 102, at 1088.
117. Walthoff-Borm et al., supra note 9.
118. See Berger & Udell, supra note 11, at 624 (stating that banks will generally not lend
to small businesses until “they achieve a level of production where their balance sheets reflect
substantial business assets that might be pledged as collateral . . . .”).
119. See Walthoff-Borm et al., supra note 9 (explaining changes in bank lending after the
2008 financial crisis).
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aftermath. 120 Growing demand for alternative funding established
crowdfunding methods like marketplace lending and equity
crowdfunding as popular sources of funding for startups and small-tomedium sized businesses. 121
Under traditional “pecking order theory,” 122 information
asymmetries typically drive entrepreneurs to use internal funds whenever
available. 123 However, when these funds are lacking, entrepreneurs turn
to debt financing, which includes marketplace lending. 124 Entrepreneurs
usually prefer debt financing to equity financing because equity financing
normally involves a dilution of their ownership share. 125 If debt financing
is neither available nor a practical option, entrepreneurs turn to external
equity financing. 126 Equity crowdfunding, a form of external equity
financing, is therefore employed as a last resort under traditional pecking
order theory. 127
A.

The Impact of Marketplace Lending on Bank Lending

Marketplace lending represents a developing non-bank activity
that competes with the traditional financial intermediation conducted by
commercial banks. 128 In 2015, the two largest marketplace lending
platforms originated $12 billion in personal unsecured loans, 129 compared
to $241 billion of outstanding personal loans in the United States. 130 A
120. Setälä, supra note 34.
121. See id. (exploring the potential use of crowdfunding as an alternative to bank

lending).
122. In corporate finance, the pecking order theory postulates that “the costs related to
information asymmetry drive entrepreneurs to first employ internal funds whenever available.
When internal funds are lacking, entrepreneurs will search for debt financing and choose only
external equity financing, including equity crowdfunding, as a last resort.” Walthoff-Borm
et al., supra note 9.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Andy Cosh et al., Outside Entrepreneurial Capital, 119 THE ECON. J. 1494, 1498
(2009).
126. Walthoff-Borm et al., supra note 9.
127. Id.
128. See Brian Wolfe & Woongsun Yoo, Crowding Out Banks: Credit Substitution by
Peer-to-Peer Lending 28 (2017), https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/bank-researchconference/annual-17th/papers/13-wolfe.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7KK-6DHK] (explaining the
effect of peer-to-peer lending on bank credit).
129. The two largest marketplace lending platforms are LendingClub, LENDINGCLUB,
Lendingclub.com [https://perma.cc/96EM-S9SU] (last visited Sept. 21, 2019), and Prosper,
PROSPER, Prosper.com [https://perma.cc/73ZQ-DTEH] (last visited Sept. 21, 2019).
130. Wolfe & Yoo, supra note 128, at 1.
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2016 report found that the global marketplace lending market was $26.6
billion in 2015, but it anticipates that this market will be worth $897.85
billion by 2024. 131 This projected growth is attributed to the after-effects
of the 2008 financial crisis, including low interest rates and lack of
sufficient funding for businesses. 132 Technological advances, improved
online interfaces, and numerous partnerships between crowdfunding
platforms are also expected to contribute to this industry’s growth. 133
For borrowers, loans from marketplace lenders generally charge
lower interest rates than similar bank loans because a majority of
marketplace lending services are automated, resulting in lower overhead
for the platforms. 134 Because marketplace lending represents an
alternative to bank lending, marketplace lenders compete with banks. 135
These lenders are able to provide loans to high-risk borrowers who cannot
obtain credit from traditional financial intermediaries. 136 This facilitates
credit expansion for borrowers who are deemed too risky by commercial
banks. 137 Marketplace lending also affects small commercial banks
through these banks’ losses in loan volume and acceptance of riskier
borrowers. 138 Most of these losses in loan volume come from high-risk
loans, as low credit borrowers seek marketplace loans in place of
commercial bank loans. 139 Large commercial banks do not currently
appear to be losing loan volume to marketplace lenders. 140 Marketplace
lending is likely to progressively affect bank lending in the future as the

131. TRANSPARENCY MKT. RESEARCH, Increasing Small Business Units to Act as Building
Blocks for Peer-to-Peer Lending Market, TRANSPARENCY MKT. RESEARCH (Aug. 31, 2016,
9:30
AM),
https://www.globenewswire.com/newsrelease/2016/08/31/868470/0/en/Increasing-Small-Business-Units-to-Act-as-BuildingBlocks-for-Peer-to-Peer-Lending-Market.html [https://perma.cc/4BUP-5ZAN].
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Freeman & Nutting, supra note 80, at 4.
135. See Wolfe & Yoo, supra note 128 (showing that “peer-to-peer lending represents an
emerging competitor to traditional depository lenders such as commercial banks.”).
136. Id. at 1.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 4 (defining small commercial banks as banks with assets less than $300
million).
139. Jess Cornaggia et al., Crowding Out Banks: Credit Substitution by Peer-to-Peer
Lending
2
(2018),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/conference/2019/fintech/Yoo_Co
rnaggia_Wolfe_FinTech [https://perma.cc/9B2L-GDHN].
140. Id. at 3.
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global marketplace lending industry increases in size and more borrowers
choose marketplace loans. 141
B.

The Impact of Equity Crowdfunding on Bank Lending

While marketplace lending directly competes with bank
lending, 142 equity crowdfunding is in less direct competition with bank
lending because entrepreneurs traditionally choose debt financing over
equity financing. 143 Although still in its infancy, equity crowdfunding is
becoming an increasingly popular source of external finance for early
stage companies, 144 as banks restricted lending after the 2008 financial
crisis. 145 Following the implementation of Reg CF and Reg A+, the
“crowd” became more involved in equity crowdfunding campaigns. 146
However, Reg D offerings continue to raise significantly more capital and
occur more frequently compared to Reg CF and Reg A+ offerings. 147 Reg
141. See TRANSPARENCY MKT. RESEARCH, supra note 131 (providing statistics that display
the growth of marketplace lending).
142. See Wolfe & Yoo, supra note 128 (explaining that marketplace lending is a form of
a “non-bank activity competing with traditional deposit-taking lenders.”).
143. See Walthoff-Borm et al., supra note 9, at 515 (explaining the rise of crowdfunding
as an alternative to traditional bank finance following the 2008 financial crisis and the pecking
order theory in corporate finance).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 516.
146. See Isaacson, supra note 51, at 463–64 (arguing that Regulation D, Regulation A+,
and Title III of the JOBS Act have failed to accomplish the JOBS Act’s goal of increasing
investment opportunities for the average investor).
147. Between September 23, 2013, and December 31, 2017, there were 7,110 Rule 506(c)
filings initiated, raising almost $183.3 billion in initial Form D filings. BAUGUESS ET AL.,
supra note 47, at 15. During the same period, there were 87,890 Rule 506(c) filings initiated,
raising almost $1.8 trillion in initial Form D filings. Id. Under Reg A+, securities offerings
outpaced the rate of those under Reg A in the period from June 19, 2015, to October 31, 2016.
KNYAZEVA, supra note 75, at 1. During that time period, issuers filed 147 offerings under
Reg A+ seeking a total of $2.6 billion. Id. Although issuers only reported earning an
approximate total of $190 million during this time period, this is likely understated due to the
limit on the reporting timeframes. Id. The SEC estimates that there were 1,351 equity
offerings under Reg CF between its implementation on May 16, 2016, and December 31,
2018. STAFF OF U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE COMMISSION, REGULATION
CROWDFUNDING 4 (2019) (providing a detailed report on crowdfunding for the first three years
following the implementation of Regulation Crowdfunding). The approximate number of
offerings increased each year, with 292 initiated in the first 12 months, 557 in the second 12
months, and 502 from May 16, 2018 through December 31, 2018. Id. During this entire
period, 105 issuers also returned to crowdfunding for follow-on offerings. Id. The median
amount reported raised for completed offerings was $107,367. Id. As of the end of 2018,
there were 45 funding portals registered with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(“FINRA”). Id. at 27. Since Reg CF’s implementation, the total proceeds from crowdfunding
campaigns and the number of successful campaigns utilizing this regulation grew
significantly. CROWDFUND CAPITAL ADVISORS, The 2018 State of Regulation Crowdfunding
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D offerings under 506(b) and 506(c) only apply narrowly in scope to
accredited investors 148 and a limited number of non-accredited
investors. 149 Because Reg CF and Reg A+ do not limit the number of
non-accredited investors who can invest in an equity crowdfunding
campaign, they are viewed as a step in the right direction towards
allowing the “crowd” to engage in investment opportunities. 150
Entrepreneurs usually prefer debt financing to equity financing
because equity financing usually involves a dilution of their ownership
share. 151 If debt financing is neither available nor a practical option,
entrepreneurs turn to external equity financing. 152 A 2018 study
examined data from 277 firms that searched for equity crowdfunding on
Crowdcube, a UK crowdfunding platform, to determine how equity
crowdfunding fits into traditional pecking order theory. 153 The study
found that firms which are less profitable, lack internal funding, have
excessive debt levels, and have high levels of intangible assets are more
likely to search for crowdfunding. 154 This indicates that firms tend to
choose equity crowdfunding as a last resort. 155 Therefore, the study
suggests that equity crowdfunding does not directly compete with bank
lending because entrepreneurs typically choose debt over equity
financing. 156 However, equity crowdfunding can help banks close the
gap on informational asymmetries that typically cause banks to avoid
lending to startup companies without a proven track record. 157 A
successful equity crowdfunding campaign signals to banks that the
– U.S. Securities-Based Crowdfunding under Title III of the JOBS Act, 1, 2 (2019),
https://cdn.crowdfundinsider.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/CCA-2018-State-ofRegulation-Crowdfunding-Summary-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJ9A-U8CM]. Between
2017 and 2018, proceeds from successful crowdfunding campaigns rose from $71.2 million
to $109.3 million, an increase of 54% within a year. Id. The number of successful offerings
also rose from 221 in 2017 to 417 in 2018 and the total number of investors in these successful
offerings increased from 77,558 in 2017 to 147,448 in 2018. Id.
148. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c) (2019).
149. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i) (2019).
150. See Isaacson, supra note 51, at 463–64.
151. Cosh et al., supra note 125, at 1498.
152. Walthoff-Borm et al., supra note 9.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 513.
155. Id. at 514.
156. Id.
157. See id. (“Because of information asymmetries, entrepreneurs prefer to use internal
financing whenever possible; next they will raise external debt financing; and, finally, when
their debt capacity is exhausted, they will raise external equity financing, but only as a last
resort.”).
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startup company will be profitable in the future and less likely to default
on a loan. 158
IV. PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN BANKS AND CROWDFUNDING PLATFORMS
A.

Bank Partnerships with Marketplace Lending Platforms

Although marketplace lending platforms primarily affect banks
through losses in loan volume and the acceptance of riskier borrowers by
small commercial banks, 159 there are opportunities for partnerships and
collaboration between marketplace lenders and banks of all sizes. 160 As
the global marketplace lending market exhibits a high potential for
growth, 161 some banks have noticed marketplace lending and become
involved in the industry. 162 Banks commonly partner with marketplace
lenders to facilitate loan transactions. 163 Banks and marketplace lenders
have also formed partnerships through acquisitions, joint ventures, and
hybrid lending practices. 164
While many marketplace lenders lend directly to borrowers, some
partner with banks to facilitate loan transactions. 165 In this partnership,
the marketplace lender collects borrower applications, provides credit
grades, and then refers the application to its partner bank. 166 Once the
partner bank receives the application, the bank makes the loan to the

158. See John Reosti, Ex-Banker’s Crowdfunding Firm Finds Its Missing Link: A Bank,
AM. BANKER (Sept. 29, 2016) (explaining how Fresno First Bank’s partnership with
Breakaway Funding helps close the “information gap” between the bank and its prospective
borrowers).
159. Wolfe & Yoo, supra note 128, at 1.
160. Julapa Jagtiani & Kose John, Fintech: The Impact on the Consumer and Regulatory
Responses, 100 J. OF ECON. AND BUS. 1, 2 (2018).
161. TRANSPARENCY MKT. RESEARCH, supra note 131 (describing the growth of
marketplace lending).
162. See Olivier Garrett, Goldman Sachs’ Recent Move Marks the End of Traditional
Banking,
FORBES
(Feb.
22,
2017,
7:00
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/oliviergarret/2017/02/22/goldman-sachs-recent-move-marksthe-end-of-traditional-banking/#657d265669aa [https://perma.cc/3UKD-Y4JT] (describing
banks’ increasing involvement in marketplace lending and Goldman Sachs’ development of
Marcus, an online lending platform).
163. Angela
Herrboldt,
Marketplace
Lending
13
(2015),
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/siwin15/si_winter2015article02.pdf [https://perma.cc/434C-5AKK].
164. Jagtiani & John, supra note 160, at 2.
165. Herrboldt, supra note 163, at 13.
166. Id. at 14.

234

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 24

borrower and then sells the loan back to the marketplace lender. 167 The
marketplace lender issues securities notes to the investors who pledged
to provide funding for the loan. 168 The borrower then makes monthly
payments to the marketplace lender, who issues payments to the investors
and charges a fee. 169
Acquisitions and joint ventures between banks and marketplace
lenders reduce banks’ lending costs through the implementation of
technology that provides banks with automated services and makes
lending easier, faster, and more cost effective. 170 As of 2019, PNC
Bank’s partnership with digital lender OnDeck Capital allows U.S.
businesses to apply for lines of credit up to $100,000 on PNC’s website
and receive an answer almost immediately through the use of OnDeck’s
technology. 171 PNC’s goal is to make credit access easier and faster for
small businesses. 172 Similarly, JP Morgan and OnDeck Capital began a
partnership in 2016, wherein OnDeck provided its technology to JP
Morgan for the bank to offer online loans to small businesses. 173 When
the partnership ended in 2019, JP Morgan developed its own platform to
continue to offer these online loans to small businesses. 174
Banks and marketplace lending platforms also partner at the
community banking level. 175 The BancAlliance network, a national
group of community banks ranging from $200 million to $10 billion in
assets, and LendingClub formed a partnership in 2015. 176 This
partnership offers BancAlliance members access to co-branded personal
loans through the LendingClub platform and the ability purchase some of
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Freeman & Nutting, supra note 80, at 4 (describing the history and development
of crowdfunding).
171. Anna Irrera, PNC Partners with OnDeck for Online Small Business Lending,
REUTERS (Oct. 22, 2018, 12:17 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pnc-ondeck/pncpartners-with-ondeck-for-online-small-business-lending-idUSKCN1MW0E6
[https://perma.cc/MP8U-XPT3].
172. See id. (describing PNC Bank’s partnership with OnDeck Capital).
173. Kevin Wack, JPMorgan Chase Ends Business Loan Partnership with OnDeck, AM.
BANKER (July 29, 2019, 9:53 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/jpmorgan-chaseends-business-loan-partnership-with-ondeck [https://perma.cc/2WYX-6UYV].
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Lending Club Partners With BancAlliance, a National Consortium of 200 Community
Banks, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 9, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/lending-club-partners-with-bancalliance-a-national-consortium-of-200-communitybanks-300032620.html [https://perma.cc/4FK8-7BQ2].
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The partnership pairs
the loans for their own portfolios. 177
LendingClub’s low cost of operations with the community banks’ low
cost of capital to decrease the cost of credit for consumers. 178
Another potential partnership between banks and marketplace
lending platforms involves a practice called “hybrid lending.” 179 Hybrid
lending combines normal balance sheet lending with off-balance sheet
lending through marketplace lending platforms. 180 Normal balance sheet
lending refers to the traditional financial intermediation of loans by banks
through withdrawable deposits, where banks lend to a borrower and hold
the loan on their balance sheet to maturity. 181 Off-balance sheet lending
refers to loans that have been moved off of a bank’s balance sheet through
pooling and securitization. 182 The combination of balance sheet and offbalance sheet lending allows businesses to finance part of a loan through
a marketplace lending platform and the rest through traditional bank
lending. 183 Rabobank, a Dutch bank, is one of the first banks in the world
to adopt a hybrid model through its own hybrid platform called Rabo &
Co. 184 The bank offers businesses the ability to finance part of their loan
on the bank’s balance sheet, while providing the remaining funding
through co-financing from institutional investors and banking clients. 185
Currently, this hybrid model is used by many of the leading marketplace
lending platforms. 186
Hybrid lending is advantageous for banks involved in lending to
riskier businesses such as startups and small businesses because it

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Auke Douwe Veenstra, Why Hybrid Lending Will Become Mainstream, BANKNXT

(Sept.
16,
2016),
https://banknxt.com/57969/hybrid-lending-mainstream/
[https://perma.cc/ADT7-MRB6].
180. Id.
181. See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System 2 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ Research, Working Paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1676947
[https://perma.cc/AY64-378V] (describing balance sheet lending).
182. See id. at 3 (describing off-balance sheet lending).
183. See Veenstra, supra note 179 (explaining the advantages and potential of hybrid
lending).
184. Id.
185. See id. (“[W]ith its own hybrid lending marketplace, the bank could take a portion of
that loan as part of its standard balance sheet lending (the amount that fits its balance sheet
risk model), and put the remainder in its marketplace for investors to fund.”).
186. Jason Jones, The Pure Marketplace Lending Model is Dead, the Hybrid Takes its
Place, LENDACADEMY (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.lendacademy.com/the-hybridmarketplace-lending-model/ [https://perma.cc/Z94R-A4L6].
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mitigates the lender’s risk. 187 This model is also advantageous for
investors. 188 When the originator of a loan retains some risk on their
balance sheet, investors have more confidence in the loans because their
incentives are aligned with the originator’s. 189 Additionally, the model
helps lenders survive periods of capital scarcity in the marketplace
lending market. 190 As small commercial banks have been affected the
most by marketplace lending through losses in loan volume and the
acceptance of riskier borrowers, they stand to gain the most from hybrid
lending. 191
B.

Bank Partnerships with Equity Crowdfunding Platforms

While equity crowdfunding may be a last resort for firms in
search of capital, 192 some banks such as Fresno First Bank have formed
partnerships with equity crowdfunding platforms. 193 In general, banks
are hesitant to provide loans to unproven startups and small businesses
that do not have significant assets. 194 Therefore, the primary advantages
of bank partnering with equity crowdfunding sites are reducing
information asymmetries that cause banks to avoid lending to startups
and small businesses, and providing startups and small businesses with
collateral. 195 The popularity of an equity crowdfunding campaign signals
to the bank that a venture can be successful, 196 while the campaign can

187. See Veenstra, supra note 179 (explaining the advantages and potential of hybrid
lending).
188. Nate Huebscher, Marketplace Lending and the Three Bears: A Fintech Tale, MEDIUM
(Feb. 20, 2017), https://medium.com/wharton-fintech/marketplace-lending-and-the-threebears-a-fintech-tale-5c1e835e6897 [https://perma.cc/V4XC-N2CN].
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See generally Wolfe & Yoo, supra note 128 (explaining the effect of peer-to-peer
lending on bank credit).
192. Walthoff-Borm et al., supra note 9, at 514.
193. See Reosti, supra note 158 (explaining the partnership between Fresno First Bank
and Breakaway Funding).
194. Berger & Udell, supra note 11, at 623–624.
195. See id. (stating that banks will generally not lend to small businesses until “they reach
a level of production where their balance sheets reflect substantial tangible business assets
that might be pledged as collateral.”).
196. See Reosti, supra note 158 (explaining the partnership between Fresno First Bank
and Breakaway Funding).
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also provide the business with sufficient capital to pledge as collateral for
a loan. 197
In 2016, Fresno First Bank formed a partnership with equity
crowdfunding platform Breakaway Funding. 198 This partnership was
designed to allow the bank to evaluate prospective clients earlier in the
capital cycle than it could otherwise. 199 First, Breakaway Funding
receives important business information such as business plans, financial
projections, and financial statements. 200 Then, Breakaway Funding
packages the information for review by the bank. 201 This information,
along with the support that a crowdfunding project receives from backers,
helps close the information gap that normally causes banks to avoid
lending to these businesses. 202 Full Circle Brewing Co. utilized this
partnership to receive a traditional bank loan from Fresno First Bank after
its successful equity crowdfunding campaign. 203
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Although crowdfunding does not yet rival traditional bank
lending, there is clear demand for alternative funding that poses a threat
to the banking industry. 204 Banks now realize the business potential for
crowdfunding and are becoming involved in the industry through their
own platforms or through partnerships with existing platforms. 205
197. See Berger & Udell, supra note 11, at 624 (stating that banks will generally not lend
to small businesses until “they reach a level of production where their balance sheets reflect
substantial business assets that might be pledged as collateral.”).
198. Reosti, supra note 158.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Castellon, supra note 1. A similar partnership formed in 2013 between BNP Paribas,
a French international bank, and Ulule, Europe’s first crowdfunding platform. BNP Paribas,
Banking and Crowdfunding: a Complementary Relationship (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://group.bnpparibas/en/news/banking-crowdfunding-complementary-relationship
[https://perma.cc/S2AT-RJGM]. The bank similarly uses information from a crowdfunding
campaign to make loans to the business, believing that a “successful crowdfunding campaign
provides a strong guarantee: it demonstrates the existence of a market, the entrepreneur’s
professionalism and their capacity to mobilize future customers.” Id. In 2017, BNP Paribas
and Ulule created a financing system where successful crowdfunding campaigns on Ulule
obtain a bank loan from BNP Paribas for an amount equal or greater to the total amount raised
by their campaign. Id.
204. See Setälä, supra note 34 (describing the rise of crowdfunding and its competition
with the banking industry).
205. See id. (exploring the potential use of crowdfunding in the banking industry).
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Although banks face less direct competition from equity crowdfunding
than from marketplace lending, 206 banks have the opportunity to benefit
through partnerships with equity crowdfunding platforms. 207 These
partnerships expand bank lending to startups and small businesses
through campaigns that provide ventures with capital that can be used as
collateral 208 and help close the information asymmetry gap between these
borrowers and banks. 209
Marketplace lending, on the other hand, directly competes with
bank lending. 210
Nevertheless, partnerships between banks and
marketplace lending platforms can position banks to benefit from the rise
of the marketplace lending industry. 211 Banks should choose to partner
with marketplace lending platforms directly through facilitating loan
transactions, acquisitions, or joint ventures, 212 or adopt hybrid lending
practices which allow banks to lend to riskier borrowers such as startups
and small businesses. 213 As marketplace lending increases, 214 these
partnerships will provide a growing source of revenue for banks and
allow them to play a central role in this emerging industry. 215
BRAGE HUMPHRIES

206. See Walthoff-Borm et al., supra note 9 (explaining how business first choose debt
finance over equity finance under traditional pecking order theory).
207. See Reosti, supra note 158 (explaining the advantages of the partnership between
Fresno First Bank and Breakaway Funding).
208. See Berger & Udell, supra note 11, at 624 (stating that banks will generally not lend
to small businesses until “they reach a level of production where their balance sheets reflect
substantial business assets that might be pledged as collateral.”).
209. See Reosti, supra note 158 (explaining how the partnership between Fresno First
Bank and Breakaway Funding allows Fresno First Bank to decrease the information gap
between it and its borrowers).
210. Wolfe & Yoo, supra note 128.
211. See Jagtiani & John, supra note 160.
212. See generally Freeman & Nutting, supra note 80, at 4 (describing the history and
development of crowdfunding).
213. See Veenstra, supra note 179 (explaining the advantages and potential of hybrid
lending).
214. TRANSPARENCY MKT. RESEARCH, supra note 131.
215. See Herrboldt, supra note 163, at 18 (describing bank participation in marketplace
lending as an attractive source of revenue for banks).

